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Abstract 
This paper explores the economic thinking behind the UK Coalition Government’s new 
framework for achieving local growth and the creation of Local Enterprise Partnerships 
(LEPs) in England. While the government’s Local Growth paper sets out ambitions to 
achieve greater spatial and industrial balance across England (and by implication the 
UK), in practice there are competing economic ideas in circulation within government 
which have influenced the ‘base’ to policy in different ways. A ‘space-neutral’  approach 
has influenced the proposed approach to planning in the National Planning Policy 
Framework, while variants of the New Economic Geography and recent Place-Based 
Approaches can be seen as having an impact in terms of documents such as Cities with 
its proposals for decentralisation.  While recognising that policy is still evolving, we argue 
that so far at least there is a mismatch between the ‘rhetoric’ and ‘policies’ of local 
growth and its limitations in practice, due to inconsistencies in the way that different 
economic ideas have been adopted in practice. As a result, the paper highlights six key 
disconnects and limitations of the economics behind the move to LEPs. In particular, it 
argues that the resulting ‘bottom up’ configuration of LEPs can be criticised – just as 
Regional Development Agencies were – as having inappropriate boundaries and scales. 
Moreover, quite how the ‘duty to cooperate’ is to be enforced is far from clear: just how 
will stronger places be incentive to cooperate with weaker places? Overall, how far the 
government goes in addressing issues of powers, resources and governance 
arrangements will to a large extent determine to what extent the policy ‘base’ is actually 
place-based in practice. 
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Introduction 
It may appear to be somewhat of an over-simplification to compare British policy making 
in Whitehall with making a pizza. Nevertheless, there are useful parallels that can be 
drawn to illustrate an examination of the economics behind the Coalition government’s 
local growth and creation of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPS).1 In particular, three 
basic layers can be identified in both. A pizza is often completed by a scattering of 
cheese, which goes on top of the chosen topping, which is layered onto the base. On a 
visit to a restaurant we may take time to choose our favoured topping . However, in 
practice, it is not the topping that marks an outstanding pizza, but the quality of the 
cooking of its base.  
Similarly, it could be argued that at a basic level, UK policy making in Whitehall involves 
three key elements (see Figure One). The top layer is the presentation of the political 
and policy case (‘rhetoric’) that accompanies policy making, which is reflected in 
Ministerial speeches and statements and in the phrasing of the supporting policy 
documents. The purpose is to communicate (and sell) to a public or professional 
audience the direction of travel and intended policy outcomes. Supporting the ‘rhetoric’ 
are the policy initiatives (‘policies’) that are designed to deliver the intended outcomes. 
The temptation, is to focus almost exclusively on the complex menu, variations and 
synergies (or not) between these top two layers. This is particularly so, as there are 
often inconsistencies. In their ‘rhetoric’, the previous Labour government emphasised 
their devolution and decentralisation credentials (e.g. HMT et al, 2004). Whist there was 
significant devolution to Scotland, Wales and London early on, Labour’s approach 
towards localism became increasingly ‘conditional’ upon meeting Whitehall’s policy 
priorities and Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were constrained in terms of what 
they could do and what targets they had to meet (Hildreth, 2011).  
To focus on the first two layers almost exclusively can result in missing an important 
lesson from the humble pizza. In parallel to the pizza base, the economic framework 
(‘base’) is the frequently neglected but crucial element which fundamentally underpins 
both the ‘rhetoric’ and the ‘policies’. Whist the ‘rhetoric’ and the ‘policies’ are constantly 
                                                            
1 Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) were announced in 2010, with Local Growth anticipating that they would 
“provide the clear vision and strategic leadership to drive sustainable private sector-led growth and job 
creation in their area” (HMG, 2010; 13).  
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changing, the ‘base’ remains remarkably constant (Richards, 2001). Indeed, arguably 
until recently, since the end of the 2nd World War there have been only three dominant 
paradigms in UK economic policy (Balls et al, 2006; Hildreth, 2009): Neo-Keynesian 
(post-1945 to the late 1970s); neo-classical (exogenous growth) (late 1970s to the mid-
1990s) and the new regional policy (mid-1990s to 2010), which saw its roots in 
endogenous growth theory (ibid).2 To follow our analogy has the ‘base’ changed again 
under local growth? And whether it has or has not, does the ‘base’ of economic ideas 
that underpin local growth fit consistently with the ‘rhetoric’ by which it is presented or 
the ‘policies’ by which it is operated?  
Figure One – UK ‘policy’ model’
 
The Coalition stated that their aim is to implement a new framework for achieving local 
growth (HMG 2010 and 2011). The ‘rhetoric’ is underpinned by four main themes, laid 
alongside the Government’s overall objective of achieving long-term macro-economic 
stability, of which reducing the financial deficit is a key part. These include a mix of 
(apparently) ‘space-neutral’ and ‘place-based’ approaches: 
• To realise the potential of every place;  
• To shift power downwards to local communities and businesses; 
• To rebalance the economy; and  
• To promote efficient and dynamic markets. 
Overall, this approach is summed up as follows:  
“The Government’s economic ambition is to create a fairer and more balanced economy 
– one that is not so dependent on a narrow range of economic sectors, is driven by 
                                                            
2 Hildreth (2009) details the three paradigms and associated sub-national policy implications. 
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private sector growth and has new business opportunities that are more evenly balanced 
across the country and between industries. The Government is therefore determined that 
all parts of the country benefit from sustainable economic growth.” (HMG, 2010, page 5) 
In analysing ‘local growth’, considering the conceptual base behind ‘policy’ and ‘rhetoric’ 
is important for two key reasons. First, there is a limited value in debating local growth 
without understanding what the thinking is behind it. It is important not to be deflected 
by the ‘rhetoric’ and the ‘policies’ themselves. Second, it is important to understand 
what really is going on in Whitehall, as a government administration works to maintain a 
consistent narrative to protect its corporate memory and manage inevitable policy 
tensions across departments.  
Labour’s ‘new regional policy’ left an extensive audit trail via HM-Treasury led papers. In 
contrast, the documentary evidence to explain what is behind Coalition Policy is 
relatively limited, although growing. Nevertheless, we can look for clues. The first, as 
indicated above, is that the ‘big ideas’ or paradigms that underpin national economic and 
public policy management change remarkably infrequently. In the economic sphere a 
new-classical paradigm has been dominant in the UK with variations since the late 1970s 
and remains highly influential today, with its accompanying ‘space neutral’ policy 
implications. This has shaped the direction of travel of certain policy developments, 
especially with regard to the National Policy Planning Framework (NPPF) (CLG, 2011) 
and Ministerial ‘rhetoric’ about relaxing planning rules, which is focusing on removing 
supply side constraints and bottlenecks in the South East especially. The second is the 
growing influence of a mix of New Economic Geography (NEG) and place-based 
approaches, for example in the resurgence of interest in cities.   
Behind this UK context, there are broader and important international policy and 
academic debates, which have seen significant recent developments. These are 
particularly over whether the focus of sub-national policy should be ‘people-based’ (or 
‘space-neutral’) or ‘place-based’. The case for ‘space-neutral’ polices was set out by the 
World Bank’s World Development Report 2009 (World Bank, 2009), centred around a 
NEG inspired framework. Meanwhile, the case for ‘place-based’ policy was set out in the 
highly influential Barca Report (2009) and three important OECD reports (2009a; 2009b 
and 2012).These give us an opportunity to explore how far the government’s local 
growth approach is really ‘place-based’ in practice. In other word, does the ‘rhetoric’ and 
‘policies’ of local growth to be ‘place-based’, really match up with the ‘base’ that informs 
it?  
This paper therefore addresses the question: what are the economics behind the move 
to local growth and Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and how far is policy ‘place 
based’ in practice? To do so, it is organised in three sections. The first outlines the shift 
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from Labour’s new regional policy to the Coalition’s local growth approach, of which the 
creation of LEPs is a central part. It shows how one outcome of this shift has been the 
rise in interest in the economic role of cities. The second introduces the international 
debates on ‘space-neutral’ and ‘people-based’ policy and explores how much impact 
these debates have had on UK sub-national policy in practice. The third highlights six 
key disconnects and limitations in the economics behind LEPS.  
From new regional policy to local growth 
New regional policy 
Over 1997-2010, the UK Labour government adopted a variation of neo-classical 
economics in its framework. Its overriding economic objective to achieving high levels of 
growth and employment in the British economy was extended to realising the potential 
of England’s regions and its localities. This was made clear in its Public Service 
Agreement (PSA) (HMT et al, 2006) for regional economic policy and in the ‘rhetoric’ of 
the opening paragraph of the Sub National Review of 2007: 
“The Government’s central economic objective is to raise the rate of sustainable growth 
and achieve rising prosperity and a better quality of life, with economic and employment 
opportunities for all. To realise this objective it is essential that every nation, region, 
locality and neighbourhood of the UK performs to its full economic potential” (HMT, 
2007, page 13) 
The building blocks of the policy were macroeconomic policy management to achieve 
sustained stability and microeconomic policy reform to (i) establish appropriately 
designed institutions operating primarily at the regional level, such as RDAs, to invest in 
regional and local growth;  and (ii) address supply side failures in the six drivers of 
economic growth (employment, skills, enterprise, innovation, investment and 
competition) at appropriate levels of intervention. 
An endogenous approach was claimed for ‘new regional policy’: 
“Britain does have the opportunity to achieve balanced growth, rising prosperity but also 
the opportunity to deliver higher growth and full employment not just in one region but 
in every region, and city of our country. 
 
To achieve this requires a new approach to regional policy – an approach where central 
government backs regional and local enterprise and initiative by exploiting the 
indigenous strengths in each region and city. But the new regional policy must be 
bottom-up not top-down, with central government enabling powerful regional and local 
initiatives to work by providing the necessary flexibility.” (Balls, 2000) 
However, in practice, despite the ‘rhetoric’ behind policy, it was largely pursued through 
RDAs that were in practice rather more accountable to Whitehall than they were to 
regions and localities, with top-down control and Whitehall-set targets. It was also 
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thematic, rather than place-based, focusing on the individual contribution of each of the 
drivers of economic growth in the context of English regions, which were administrative 
rather than economic constructs. Nevertheless, there were some advantages to having 
RDAs. For example, the RDAs were well placed to make choices, based on local and 
regional intelligence, about where to get the best economic return on interventions, and 
from a vantage point where they could view clusters and activities that cross local 
authority (and now LEP) borders. Post RDAs this has become more difficult.  
Local Growth – going back to the 1980s? 
As noted above, beyond the overriding objective of macro-economic stability, there are 
four key themes of the government’s local growth agenda. Firstly, there is the desire to 
realise the potential of every place, by that places are different and have different routes 
and potential to progress. A particular acknowledgement is given of the potential of 
English cities to “be the motors of our economic recovery” (HMG, 2010a). Secondly, the 
government wishes to “shift power to local communities and businesses” (HMG, 2010), 
on the basis that “every place is unique and has the potential to progress” and “are best 
placed themselves to understand the drivers and barriers to local growth and 
prosperity”. Places are to be offered the opportunity to tailor their approach to their local 
circumstances (HMG, 2010a). However, not all places will grow at the same rate or 
become an ‘economic powerhouse’. Very early in the Administration, an invitation was 
sent to local authorities and business leaders to submit proposals to establish LEPs to 
reflect the “natural economic geography of their areas" (HMG, 2010b). This emphasis 
was also reflected in the first round of ‘City Deals’, between the Government with each of 
the eight English Core Cities.3 Here a strong emphasis was also placed on the 
importance of dynamic local leadership.  Thirdly, an emphasis on rebalancing the 
economy, by reducing over-dependence on public sector employment in some parts of 
the country and a national over-reliance on financial services in the UK economy overall, 
through creating the conditions to enable private sector growth. This is underpinned by a 
UK infrastructure framework to focus investment in infrastructure to have a long-term 
impact on economic growth.  Fourthly, the government aims to promote efficient 
markets, by introducing supply side reforms, such as to the planning system, to 
incentivise business and housing investment and growth.  
In policy terms, the abolition of the RDAs and their effective replacement by LEPs was at 
the heart of this new approach. However, the precise role of LEPS was relatively 
                                                            
3 See DCLG Press Release on City Deals, 5th July 2012. Available at: 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/news/newsroom/2173980 
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undefined and it could be argued that many of the functions of the former RDAs (on 
industrial policy, inward investment attraction, business support and so on) were, 
initially at least, re-centralised (Hildreth and Bailey, 2012; Froud et al, 2011). 
Meanwhile, questions remain as to whether the new LEPs really match ‘functional 
economic geographies’ in towns and cities (a point noted, inter alia - by Heseltine 
(2012), the CBI (2012) and Bentley et al (2010)) and quite how they will be incentivised 
to cooperate.  
Despite the rhetoric of a ‘place-based’ approach, in practice, the Coalition appears to 
have gone back to an earlier variation of the neo-classical framework. On the face of it, 
this takes us back into the world inhabited by the Thatcher government in the early 
1980s, with its emphasis on reducing the state, cutting regulation and increasing 
competitiveness. The argument is that this creates space for private sector growth 
through self-correcting market adjustments in prices, wages and capital leading in turn 
to spatial adjustment in the movement of people and firms between places creating 
greater economic balance. The impact of this thinking can be seen in practice in 
Enterprise Zones and the NPPF (DCLG, 2011a).4 Further, the problem of housing supply 
is seen primarily in terms of planning restraints impeding market efficiency. 
Fundamental questions about institutional weaknesses in the UK model of house 
building, which would be part of a ‘place-based’ approach, are not even posed.5  
 
Nevertheless, there are similarities in the ‘rhetoric’ presenting new regional policy and 
local growth. For example, both claim to be about the realisation of local indigenous 
potential through ‘bottom-up’ approaches. However, in ‘policy’ terms there are major 
differences. The previous government’s new regional policy was built on the thematic 
drivers of growth framework and used the English administrative regions as its principal 
building block. By comparison a thematic analysis is absent from the current 
government’s local growth narrative and its focus is on the contribution of localities and 
communities to economic growth. It also places a stronger emphasis on the enabling role 
of the private sector to be facilitated by more efficient markets and the rolling back of 
the state. In addition, it significantly downgrades any emphasis on the role of effective 
intermediary institutions (RDAs), which was a central feature of new regional policy. 
                                                            
4 Although there is reference to ‘sustainable development’ in the draft framework (DCLG, 
2011a, paragraphs 9-18), along with an attempt to apply the Bruntland definition, there 
is no legal definition used to actually underpin policy. 
 
5 The neo-classical perspective has also shaped the re-emergence of Enterprise Zones 
(EZs) as a flagship policy of local growth. This is despite the reality of past experience 
with EZs from the 1980s, which is at best ambiguous and at worst somewhat 
disappointing in terms of net effects and cost per job (see Papke, 1993).  
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Other ‘policy’ differences lie in the absence of a detailed industrial policy and the 
centralisation of many regional (RDA) functions to Whitehall.   
However, it is in the underlying framework (or ‘base’) where the basis for these real 
differences lies. One factor has already been identified – the apparent shift back to an 
earlier variation of the neo-classical framework. But there may be another, the 
emergence of ‘space neutral’ approaches underpinned by developments in New Economic 
Geography (NEG), which is discussed in the next section. This has significance, not just 
in the context of local growth, but also in wider international debates about the 
appropriate nature of sub-national policy.  
 
Broader Debates in ‘Space-Neutral’ and ‘Place-Based’ Policy 
 
‘Space-Neutral’ Approaches and the NEG 
 
As stated above, the second clue to the underpinning of local growth is the growing 
influence of NEG. On the face of it, there might appear to be a contradiction in the UK 
Government being influenced by both a neo-classical (space-neutral) and a NEG 
approach. Simply put, the basic neo-classical model operates in a world that is 
essentially economically ‘flat’, where convergence between regions was more likely over 
the long-term through self-correcting market adjustment. By contrast, NEG, whilst 
essentially neo-classical in its formation, adopts variations in basic assumptions that lead 
it to see the world as essentially ‘spiky’, explaining unevenness in economic activity 
between places through agglomeration economies that are largely related to city size. 
Spatially uneven development is predicted through localised increasing return effects, 
raising local productivity and making particular regions (cities) increasingly attractive to 
firms and workers.6 Rather than predicting convergence, NEG models suggest that it 
might even counter-productive to pursue geographically balanced development (e.g. see 
Gardiner et al, forthcoming). 
 
However, what is also interesting about the NEG framework is that, despite the clear 
recognition of the economic role of cities, it can be associated with a ‘space-neutral’ 
approach to policy making. This is most apparent in the World Development Report 
(World Bank, 2009), which advocates, within a NEG-inspired framework the promotion of 
agglomerations in development and the establishment of ‘spatially-neutral’ institutions 
(for example in education, health and social services) as first order solutions, supported  
                                                            
6 For an excellent recent summary of the NEG and other theoretical perspectives in spatial development see 
Gardiner, Martin and Tyler (forthcoming)  
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by infrastructure to connect weaker to stronger places across distance and only very 
sparingly, spatially-targeted interventions as second and third order solutions 
respectively. In highlighting the advantages arising from the agglomeration effects of 
large-cities, the World Bank report essentially argues that growth and development by 
its very nature will be unbalanced and that efforts to spread economic activities will be 
counter-productive, in undermining growth and prosperity (World Bank 2009). As such, 
the report proposes a ‘spatially blind’ strategy, with policies designed “without explicit 
consideration to space” (World Bank, 2009; 24). Such  spatially-blind policies are in turn 
often seen as ‘people based’ in that mobility should be encouraged so that people can 
move to where they can be most productive (particularly cities). This enables people to 
live where they expect to be better off, and in so doing boosts incomes, productivity, 
knowledge and overall growth (World Bank, 2009; page 77).7  
In a UK context, this World Bank report may appear to have had little direct influence. 
However, a NEG framework is deployed in the UK context to make the case that spatial 
disparities are indeed driven by ‘people’ and not ‘place’ characteristics.8 Given that it is 
hard to change ‘area effects’, it is then argued that it is better to focus investment on 
‘people’ rather than ‘place’.9 Thus the case is made to prioritise the growth of successful 
cities (located primarily in the South East), even if this results in more uneven 
development within England. In this context market barriers (such as planning 
restrictions) are highlighted. A case is presented for universal reforms, for example in 
the liberalisation of planning regimes with the anticipation that greatest impact will be 
spatially on house building, office development and  growth in the already more 
successful London and GSE area (Overman and Gibbons, 2011). Nevertheless, localism 
is still supported under this approach, since although it may make little difference in 
practice to helping growth, it does facilitate and incentivise experimentation (Leunig and 
Swaffield, 2008).     
These arguments are partially accepted within the government’s evidence paper (BIS 
2010), that was published alongside its White Paper Local Growth (HMG 2010) . It points 
out that wide spatial imbalances between London and the South East and the rest of the 
country have been growing since the 1970s, reinforced by London’s high productivity 
growth. Despite Labour’s regional policy, “the gap between leading and lagging regions 
has widened” and that in any case “there may be substantial limits to how 
geographically balanced an economy may become.” (BIS 2010, page 26).  
                                                            
7 See Barca et al (2012) for an overview and assessment. 
8 “The role of the individual matters as much, if not more, than the role of place” (HMG, 2010; 9). 
9 An argument made by Gibbons et al (2010) and Gibbons and Overman (2011).  
10 
 
But if neo-classical ideas also remain important in government, how is this reconciled 
with NEG influences? The answer may lie in a perspective that sees England as having 
one significant ‘spike’ (London with the Greater South East (GSE)) with the rest of the 
country being relatively flat in comparison. In practice London has been the favoured 
region, driven by concerns over London and the GSE’s world role in the Global Economy. 
The extent to which this is so was amply illustrated by the Prime Minister prioritising the 
financial services industry in the City of London over the interests of other trading 
sectors in the UK in his veto at a recent European Summit.  
It is rather like moving from a nine (administrative) region model of England under 
Labour to a two region model under the Coalition. But if this is so, is there nothing that 
can be done for the rest of the country?  The answer given lies in recognising that other 
cities might offer ‘mini-spikes’, whose potential might be realised by: “….empowering 
and incentivising local government, firms and people across economic centres and 
natural geographies to promote growth and correct the market and government failures 
which are acting as barriers to economic development” (BIS 2010, page 25).10 Here, it is 
perhaps that the NEG has had an influence along with recent ‘place-based’ approaches.  
This rise of interest in the economic case for cities has been sometime in coming. Back in 
2001, when a key report on the foundations of new regional policy was published by the 
HM-Treasury (HMT and DTI, 2001), cities were almost absent from the economic 
analysis. However, by 2006, the third of the HM-Treasury ‘Devolved Decision-Making’ 
series was published, focussing on the economic role of cities (HMT et al, 2006). A 
review of sub-national regeneration policy (HMT et al, 2007) gave formal recognition to 
functional economies (and potentially city-regions) as appropriate contexts for sub-
national policy. This process has evolved further under the Coalition.  
The outcome is seen in ‘Unlocking Growth in Cities’ (‘Cities’) (HMG 2011), which offered 
to  cities and their LEPs (particularly the Core Cities) the potential opportunity of more 
powers and incentives to “take their economic destiny into their own hands” and reach 
their full potential (HMG, 2011, foreword).  Whilst the Core Cities grasped the 
opportunities made available to them and entered fully with commitment into the 
process of negotiation with Whitehall, it is important to identify the limitations of this 
approach at this point in time, which we turn to later. 
If the NEG framework has had some influence in Whitehall, at least in helping to raise 
policy interest in cities, what has been the impact of recent developments in ‘place-
                                                            
10 While Local Growth itself highlights the agglomeration effects in driving growth in London (with benefits for 
growth elsewhere) (HMG, 2010; Para 1.15), it also notes that “many small towns and cities have grown faster 
than some large towns and cities’ (HMG, 2010; para 1.16). 
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based’ approaches? Given the emphasis in the ‘rhetoric’ in local growth about local 
places, it might be expected that the influence might be increasingly strong. 
The Emergence of ‘Place-Based’ Approaches 
Several recent major policy reports and papers have been produced advocating ‘place-
based’ approaches (Barca, 2009; OECD, 2009a, b; Barca et al 2012). For example, the 
Barca Report has been highly influential in the redesign of European Cohesion Policy for 
the period 2014-20.11 While it would be possible to exaggerate the differences between 
the NEG ‘space-neutral’ and ‘place-based’ approaches, there are nevertheless important 
differences in their underlying frameworks which are rehearsed in detail elsewhere 
(McCann and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011; Barca and McCann, 2010; Gill, 2010) and can be 
summarised as shown in Figure Two.   
Figure Two – Contrast between ‘space-blind’ and ‘place-based’ policy approaches 
 
These ideas draw on different thinking about ‘place’ and the new economics of 
institutions. Underlying this approach is a set of important conceptual ideas, which may 
be summarised. 
                                                            
11 See for example European Commission (2011) on the proposals for the new Cohesion Policy for 
2014-20. Barca (2009) effectively argued for a stronger linkage between accountability and 
autonomy in EU regional policy. He criticised existing EU Cohesion Policy on a number of levels, 
but in particular argued that EU Cohesion Policy was unable to foster the institutional reforms 
needed to unlock strong regional development. Ultimately Barca called for a greater public 
accountability of national authorities, with binding agreements and possible sanctions on issues 
such as data provision, the setting of clear policy objectives, and greater transparency in 
conducting policy, all in return for more freedom to tailor and experiment in policy design.  
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The objective of ‘place-based’ policy is to promote growth in all regions, based on the 
principle that it is the performance of the urban system as a whole, rather than that of 
just relatively successful cities that is significant (Barca, 2009; Barca, McCann and 
Rodríguez-Pose et al 2012). For example, the OECD point out those regions with average 
GDP per capita below 75% of national average accounted for 43% of growth across 
OECD 1995-2007 (OECD, 2012). In a globalised world space and place is seen to be 
more important (McCann, 2008). Unlike in a NEG model, which sees the urban system as 
homogeneous, the place-based approach presents it as heterogeneous, shaped by the 
distinctive geographical, historical, cultural, social and institutional settings of different 
places. The capacity of territories to root their economic activity into the local 
institutional fabric will be at the heart of their economic success, since the generation, 
acquisition and exchange of knowledge and the life blood of all firms is mediated and 
reflected in geography. However, knowledge is uncertain and is embedded in localities 
and needs to be uncovered through participatory and bottom-up processes to build 
consensus and trust (Barca et al, 2012)  
However, the tendency of the ‘state’ is to lack both an understanding and knowledge of 
local places (lacks ‘sense of community’ (e.g. Barca, McCann and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012), 
with a consequent weakness in its capacity to adapt its approach towards local places 
and mediate local consensus and trust between local actors as well as mobilise local 
resources effectively. Further, it is also prone to the influence of ‘capital city’ elites in 
policy making, favouring infrastructure, innovation and sectoral investment for the 
capital rather than other places (Barca, McCann and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). This has the 
important implication that agglomerations have both natural and unnatural (i.e. policy 
and resource driven) characteristics.  
Beyond the capital city at local levels, ‘under-development’ traps may occur that limit 
and inhibit the growth potential of regions or perpetuate social exclusion. This may relate 
to a failure of local elites to act or because of institutional weaknesses (Barca, 2009). 
The generation of ideas and appropriate solutions should be generated collaborative 
endogenously (by local stakeholders) and exogenously (by external actors) leading to 
explicit spatial targeting of places with appropriate bundles of public goods within a 
multi-governance approach.  
Overall, place-based approaches have two essential underpinnings (Barca et al, 2012). 
Firstly, they see geographical context as key, and that a supposed ‘space neutral’ policy 
will always have spatial effects which may undermine policy objectives unless accounted 
for (ibid). Secondly, knowledge is seen as critical for effective policy development.  In 
reality, such knowledge is not readily available, and as a result policy should aim to 
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stimulate new knowledge and ideas through interactions between local groups and 
external elites (ibid).  On this knowledge attribute, the smart specialisation approach has 
been closely linked with place-based approaches to regional development policy, at least 
in how it has been developed in the European context (European Commission, 2011). In 
particular, in terms of regional policy it has been used to emphasise the need to exploit 
related variety, build regional embeddedness and enable strategic diversification. In so 
doing it stresses the need for regional actors (government, firms, universities, research 
institutions) to collaborate, recognising the current starting point for the region in terms 
of skills, technologies and institutional governance and then to build on these capabilities 
rather than trying to start ‘from scratch’ (Wolfe, 2011). This place-based smart 
specialisation approach therefore has parallels with Rodrik’s (2004) perspective of 
industrial policy as a process of discovery requiring strategic collaboration between the 
private sector and state in unlocking growth opportunities, but set within a framework of 
multi-level governance so as to enable a process of local collaboration and discovery 
while enabling external challenge to local elites engaging in rent-seeking behaviour. 
It is not entirely clear how far this ‘place-based’ framework has yet influenced thinking in 
the UK. The absence of any serious discussion of the new international literature in a 
recent UK review of people and place-based approaches would suggest the influence so 
far has been surprisingly limited (Crowley et al, 2012). However, as already indicated 
some of the underlying concepts are reflected in the ‘rhetoric’ of local growth, 
particularly in the emphasis on the uniqueness of different places and on the need for 
local solutions. This can also be found in the concept of ‘City Deals’, where the Core 
Cities, in phase one, have been encouraged to negotiate with Whitehall their own 
package of solutions for their sub-region or city-region, with certain powers passed to 
cities in return for setting targets and addressing governance issues. 
However, as we have already explained, there can be a disconnect between the 
‘rhetoric’, ‘policy’ and ‘base’. The question is what disconnects are there in relation to 
local growth and what limitations do these place on the economics behind LEPs in 
practice? It is to this that the paper turns next. 
Disconnects and Limitations in the economics behind ‘Localism’ 
In practice a number of disconnects and limitations can be identified in the government’s 
approach.  Firstly, the framework underpinning local growth can be viewed as a two 
region model: London and the rest of England. Within the proposed framework London 
and its city region (GSE) retains its highly privileged position, as the ‘global city’ that is 
deemed to be absolutely essential, through its financial services industry, to UK 
competitiveness in the world economy. It is clear that despite the first phase of City 
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Deals on offer, the London model of devolution is not on offer to cities or towns 
elsewhere in England, so far at least. Building High-Speed 2 might be seen as a way of 
linking Birmingham more closely to the GSE, rather than the other way round. In 
addition, major infrastructure investment projects are focussed on the London, such as 
the Olympic Games, Cross Rail and the even the private sector led London Gateway, to 
restore London’s pre-eminence as a port gateway to the rest of the UK. Present debates 
around airport capacity are almost entirely centred on London and the South East. A 
‘place-based’ approach warns of the potential of national policy to prioritise the capital 
city and focus insufficiently on the economic potential of the rest of the country. The 
removal of RDAs has effectively removed a tier of governance that was – in some cases 
at least - engaged in attempts to exploit related variety, build regional embeddedness 
and enable strategic diversification (see Bailey et al, 2010, on the West Midlands for 
example). In essence the policy ‘base’ here is ‘space-neutral’, emphasising the 
importance of London and the GSE. 
 
Secondly, there is a tension in the approach towards cities outside London, reflecting the 
competing ‘base’ approaches. Indeed, it is not entirely clear, even after the 
announcement of ‘City Deals’, what the aim of policy is towards cities outside of London. 
Are they seen as centres for a holistic vision of investing in developing the 
agglomeration, innovation and enterprise capacity of cities and their functional 
economies (a ‘place-based’ approach)? Or are they being used as a context  to effect 
further deregulation (e.g. planning), liberalisation and incentives (Enterprise Zones) and 
competitiveness (remove localised bottlenecks in transport, housing and broadband) to 
‘free up the private sector’ with the hopeful expectation of fostering further economic 
activity (a space-neutral approach)?  Cities (HMG, 2011) raised hopes of significant 
decentralisation to the English Core Cities through ‘City Deals’ along with significant 
finance raising powers, but how far this will actually go is still far from clear. In 
particular, will the Treasury or other departments allow this to happen as measures in 
the complex deals become implemented?    
 
Thirdly, despite the rhetoric of localism (‘we want powerful innovative cities that are able 
to shape their economic destinies, boost regions and get the national economy growing)’ 
(HMG, 2011, page iii),  the tone of ‘Cities’ remains conditional and dependent on cities 
offering something in return: i.e. ‘we will give you additional powers if you prove 
yourself’.12  In practice, Whitehall is uncomfortable with devolution. England remains a 
highly centralised country. Despite the rhetoric of devolution, as indicated above, many 
                                                            
12 See HMG (2011, page 2): “Where cities want to take on significant new powers and funding, 
they will need to demonstrate strong, visible and accountable leadership and effective decision-
making structures”. 
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RDA functions have been re-centralised and the financially limited ‘Regional Growth 
Fund’ is being distributed in a top-down way from London. ‘Cities’ offers comparisons 
between English and continental cities. All the latter come from Western European 
countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) that have strong ‘representative localism’ 
models with devolved powers far beyond what is currently on offer to the Core Cities. 
The ‘conditional localism’ tone of ‘Cities’ is not encouraging. It gives the impression that 
the Core Cities somehow need to ‘get their act together’.  In reality, cities like 
Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester showed how to lead by example in laying the 
foundations for the urban renaissance of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and more 
recently by responding to recession. It is often Whitehall that has been slow to respond. 
So while city deals suggest a place-based approach, they do not match international 
comparisons. 
Fourthly, there is the danger of securing limited outcomes in practice. There was a risk 
that negotiations would evolve over individual elements of a package, leading to 
piecemeal change rather than a comprehensive rearrangement in the balance of 
resources and responsibilities between Whitehall and the cities. Some of this danger has 
actually emerged in the detail of the deals. It is important to recognise that the 
European cities that are doing much better than our cities (e.g. Germany, France, 
Sweden and Finland) have considerably much more control over their destinies than our 
cities do. As noted above, this limited approach will be reinforced by tensions between 
Whitehall departments over how far and to devolve. Not all departments were as 
committed to decentralisation towards cites as others. A different more ‘place-based’ 
approach could have been taken to city deals. This would have involved setting out 
strategic objectives for a programme together with a set of devolved and decentralised 
measures, resources and incentives from Whitehall to enable these objectives to have 
been achieved. It would then have been for the cities to respond with their own 
distinctive implementation plans. Such an approach would have been much more in line 
with a European cities or ‘multi-governance’ model.  
In practice, while the City Deals can be seen as useful first steps, the deal on ‘offer’ 
varies considerably across the first wave of English cities and there remains a stark 
contrast with the recentralising element of government policy. Genuinely enhancing the 
power and resources of local government and LEPs (which have different geographies 
and anyway raise governance issues which are noted below) would require more 
localised control over currently centralised funds such as the Regional Growth Fund, 
training programmes and the Work Programme (a point which the Heseltine Review 
(Heseltine, 2012) in effect acknowledges). This lack of local power is compounded by the 
fact that many LEPs also have limited resources, especially those unconnected to a ‘core 
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city’ with a ‘City Deal’. This is particularly the case given that the centrally-distributed 
Regional Growth Fund to which LEPs bid has a substantially smaller pot of money 
available to support regional growth than that which previously went via the RDAs. While 
the Local Government Resource Review (DCLG, 2011b) did indicate that local authorities 
will be able to keep any growth in business rates, in the hope that this will create a 
stronger incentive effect to promote growth, many commentators feel that LEPs need 
greater finance raising ability (such as bond issuing powers) so as to get things done 
locally (see APPG, 2012; Bentley et al, 2010).  
Fifthly, part of the rationale for LEPs is that local (or city) economies do not stop at local 
authority boundaries, requiring collaboration across wider spatial areas. Evidence from 
Europe is quoted in ‘Cities’ that: “where the level of decision-making is a good fit with a 
city’s economic footprint this is associated with better economic performance” (BIS 
2010, page 16). However, this logic has not been followed through in the bottom-up 
creation of LEPs. Some like Manchester make good economic sense. Others like 
Birmingham are considerably well under-bounded. Overall, many of the LEP areas are far 
too small for effective policy making. The NPPF does attempt to rectify this to some 
extent by including a ‘duty to cooperate’ on planning issues that cross boundaries, but 
contains little or no guidance on what the duty means in practice nor clarifies what 
effective sanctions could be applied if local authorities or the myriad of other 
organisations involved fail in this duty, and as such can be seen as ‘ineffective’ (see 
House of Commons, 2011) with a need for LEPs to be ‘supported and incentivised’ to 
collaborate (APPG, 2012; page 16). A possibility is to link enhanced City Deal funding 
with better LEP alignment (whether by merger or cooperation). At some point an 
intermediate scale will have to be back on the agenda to join up the work of the LEPs, 
some of which look fragmented. Here the lessons from RDAs, both positive and negative, 
will need to be remembered. This also suggests the need for flexibility in governance 
arrangements across LEPs if place-based approaches are to be developed further.13 
Sixthly, there remains the question of what happens to the LEPs that are not connected 
with a Core City (which may benefit by gaining new powers and revenue raising 
potential)? The ‘City Relationships’ study for the former Northern Way (Work Foundation, 
SURF and Centre for Cities (2010)) showed a complexity of economic linkages between 
towns and cities across Northern city regions. Many of the old industrial and port cities 
                                                            
13 Several LEPs have been beset by local political problems, with diverse local constituencies and memberships 
making decisions difficult. Coventry and Warwickshire LEP, for example, needed a new chair after 
disagreement over whether the LEP or local authorities would take control of transport, while at the time of 
writing Warwickshire had withdrawn from a proposed City deal bid given concerns over the borrowing 
required to fund new developments. 
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and towns like Burnley, Hull and Grimsby are relatively isolated in their commuting 
patterns and in their business networks. Their natural economies are too small, even 
within their designated LEPs and the consequences of their histories too great, to 
achieve much progress at such local levels. Indeed, expectations must be of continuing 
growing divides, even between places in the North and Midlands (see also Crowley et al, 
2012). It is not clear that the second round of City Deals would address this, because 
the underlying challenge is that the LEP areas are too small to be effective.  
Points 5 and 6 together represent perhaps the biggest challenge towards the new 
framework.  A major criticism of the RDAs was that that they were effectively imposed in 
a top-down and arbitrary way. As a result they were seen as bearing little relationship 
with functional economic geographies, and were not accountable to localities. RDAs had 
the ‘wrong geography’ it was argued. In contrast, the creation of LEPs has been very 
much a bottom-up driven process, and while potentially helpful in terms of closeness to 
people and accountability, there is no guarantee that the configuration of LEPs that has 
emerged has the ‘right geography’ either. In fact, the new configuration of new LEPs 
may have just as severe problems over scale and boundaries as the old RDAs, albeit in a 
different form.14 A particular challenge now arising is how the ‘duty to cooperate’ is to be 
made real. When interactions take place over different scales, how are stronger places 
going to be incentivised to cooperate with weaker places? That has yet to be made clear 
in government policy. Yet this cross-border collaboration is essential if the positive 
elements of RDA experience are not to be lost completely and a place-based smart-
specialisation approach can be developed in the context of multi-level governance.  
It is difficult to see how this shift to a policy of ‘centralised localism’ will actually help, 
for example, clusters in mature industrial regions like the West Midlands compete in the 
high-skill and high-technology niches that increasingly they occupy (Bentley et al, 
2010). Indeed, it is in the areas of cluster and innovation policy that there may be 
particular challenges. Part of the problem is that what remains of industrial policy will 
be based in London, where civil servants are removed from events on the ground and 
generally lack the capacity to develop appropriate industrial policies for the 
reconstruction of the manufacturing base (Froud et al, 2011). The key point here is 
that RDAs were often better positioned to make judgements about how best to offer 
support and to which clusters (and/or technologies) as they had a superior information 
base than central government.  
 
                                                            
14 See Townsend (2012): “there is a much greater variety in the integrity and usefulness of different LEPs than 
among the regions that preceded them”. 
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In a sense the opposite may also hold true, in that excessive decentralisation may see 
an ‘all hands in the pork barrel’ approach, with a fragmentation of RDAs into much 
smaller LEPs leading to limited public resources effectively being wasted on a myriad on 
micro-scale and uncoordinated projects. As Swinney et al (2010) note, only a small 
number of cities will actually be able to develop specialist clusters in sectors identified 
as ‘high-growth’ industries, and they identified a serious “reality gap” in policy. The 
danger is that many such projects are likely to fail as they will not actually be building 
on natural historical bases with genuine skill sets that can be re-orientated towards 
new growth or ‘phoenix’ clusters (ibid) in a smart specialisation sense. 
   
An important lesson is that there remains a key role the coordination of LEP economic 
and cluster strategies, most obviously via some sort of intermediate tier infrastructure. 
This relates to Lovering’s (2001) much earlier point regarding the relevant scale of 
governance. The relevant economic scale for the automotive cluster for instance covers 
at least five English regions (the East Midlands, North West, South East, South West and 
the West Midlands). The need for joint LEP working can also be evidenced in the regional 
data and intelligence legacy of the RDAs. Whilst this is being retained in places such as 
Birmingham and Manchester after the abolition of RDAs, it is not clear whether other 
parts of their regions will have access to such data and intelligence. The key point is that 
if smart specialisation is an important element of place-based approaches, then 
questions remain as to whether LEPs have the powers, resources and governance 
arrangements necessary to deliver such an approach. This is especially pertinent if, as 
Barca et al (2012) suggest, ‘place-based’ development strategies require mechanisms 
which build on local capabilities and promote innovative ideas through the interaction of 
local and general knowledge and of endogenous and exogenous actors. 
Conclusions 
This paper has explained why it is important to understand the economics behind LEPs 
and local growth. As the picture becomes clearer it becomes obvious that there is a 
mismatch between the rhetoric of local growth and its limitations in practice, so far at 
least. Local growth (HMG 2010) sets out ambitions to achieve greater spatial and 
industrial balance across England (and by implication the UK). In practice, however, 
there are competing economic ideas in circulation within government which have 
influenced policy in different ways. A ‘space-neutral’ neo-classical approach in particular 
has influenced the proposed approach to planning in the NPPF, while a mix of NEG and 
‘place-based’ approaches can be seen as having an impact in terms of documents such 
as Cities with its proposals for decentralisation to the ‘right’ level.  Quite how far the 
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latter will progress is a key question at the time of writing, especially in the form of City 
Deals.  
This is critical as the claim by Nick Clegg the Deputy Prime Minister in ‘Cities’ to create 
“…powerful, innovative cities that are able to shape their economic destinies,  boost 
entire regions and get the national economy going” (HMG 2011 preface) is not yet 
convincing in practice. What is presented as a framework to empower cities to promote 
growth actually looks in practice to be conditional, piecemeal and potentially limited, 
with powers and resources perhaps too limited for effective ‘place-based’ approaches 
Indeed is it more fitting to a view of England where the spikes outside London and the 
GSE are more mini than real?  
The different experiences of regions in England are the real challenge that we now face. 
However, at the moment the thinking behind policy is still incomplete and contradictory. 
On the one hand, the ‘space-neutral’ neo-classical perspective brings out the emphasis 
on supply side reform and the reduction of costs to enable space for private sector 
growth. But this does little to address the qualitative improvement in local economies in 
the regions outside the GSE that we argue is needed. On the other, there is the 
beginning of a ‘place based’ approach recognising that the regional cities and their 
hinterlands might offer potential as important ‘places’ or sites for endogenous growth. 
However, the resulting bottom-up and at times fragmented configuration of LEPs can be 
criticised - as RDAs were – as having inappropriate boundaries and scales. Moreover, 
quite how the ‘duty to cooperate’ is to be enforced is far from clear: just how will 
stronger places be incentive to cooperate with weaker places?  How far the government 
goes in addressing these issues of powers, resources and governance arrangements will 
to a large extent determine to what extent the policy ‘base’ is actually place-based in 
practice. 
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